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Introduction
The conceptualisation of political parties, ideologies and candidates as ‘brands’ has become an accepted 
proposition and a recognised area of research that continues to evolve and develop (French and Smith 
2010; Harris and Lock 2010; Lock and Harris 1996). Rawson (2007) argued that political brands are 
powerful important devices, which need to be thoroughly understood (Needham 2006; Phipps et al. 
2010; Van Ham 2001). Political brands can be seen as a trinity of three elements, including the party 
leader, political party and party policy (Butler et al. 2011; Davies and Mian 2010; Smith and French 2011). 
Existing research has tended to focus on one (Smith and French 2011) or two aspects (Davies and Mian 
2010) of the trinity, neglecting the exploration of all three elements of the political brand (Pich et al. 
2014). Political branding, especially with a focus on all three elements deserves more attention (Peng 
and Hackley 2009; Rawson 2007; Reeves et al. 2006; Robinson 2004; Schneider 2004; Smith 2009; Van 
Ham 2001). More specifically, research focusing on the exploration of external political brand image 
remains limited with explicit calls for additional research in this area (Guzman and Sierra 2009; Schneider 
2004; Smith 2001; Smith and French 2011). However, there are very few models or frameworks that 
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promote the deconstruction and understanding of brand image. Therefore, this paper will seek to 
critically apply the brand image framework (Bosch et al. 2006a) in exploration of the three elements 
of the UK Conservative Party which will highlight its ‘transfer potential’ (Schneider 2004, 60) to the 
context of political branding.
Brand image
Brand image has been defined as ‘the set of mental representations, emotional and/or cognitive an 
individual or a group of individuals ascribe to a brand’ (Mengxia 2007, 36). Further, brand image can 
be seen as a set of perceptions about an organisation, product or brand developed in the mind of the 
consumer (Bosch et al. 2006b; Chen 2010; Einstein 2008; Morgan et al. 2002). This external imagery can 
be problematic for a brand’s creator to manage, given that it cannot have full control of the external 
stakeholders thought process (Nilson and Surrey 1998; Petromilli, and Michalczyk 1999; Rekom et al. 
2006). This demonstrates that brand image is complex and broad, with various conceptualisations 
across the marketing literature (Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2002; Henrik and Fredrik 2006; Keller 1993; 
Knox and Freeman 2006; Poiesz 1989). Brand image, therefore, is how the brand is understood. This is 
in contrast to brand identity. Brand identity has been defined as the internally envisaged aspirations 
communicated to the target audience (Pich et al. 2014). de Chernatony (2007, 47) argues that there is 
a need to understand ‘the way customers perceive the brand, since their perceptions may be different 
from the intended projections’. Therefore, understanding the external associations and perceptions 
will not only generate deeper insight into a brand, but also highlight whether the understood external 
image is coherent with the aspired internal identity.
McEnally and de Chernatony (1999) call for a greater understanding of the image creation process 
from a consumer perspective. Furthermore, insight into brand image requires greater elaboration and 
more empirical research to strengthen this area of study (Alsem and Kostelijk 2008; Chen 2010; Cretu 
and Brodie 2007; Guzman and Sierra 2009; Henrik and Fredrik 2006; Johns and Gylmothy 2008; Knox 
and Freeman 2006; Poiesz 1989; Smith 2001). The existing literature tends to focus on internal brand 
identity (Davies and Chun 2002) and often poorly conceptualises brand image in comparison (Ross 
and Harradine 2011; Saaksjarvi and Samiee 2011; Srivastava 2011). Therefore, existing brand image 
research tends to neglect the development and assessment of brand image frameworks. This highlights 
a specific problem of how to deconstruct or operationalise brand image insights, given the limited 
frameworks in which to explore brand image (Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2002; Johns and Glymothy 
Brand Image
Associations
Strength
Uniqueness
Expectations
Perceptions
&
Associations
Experiences
Evaluations
Determined by the complexity of the brand identity
external stakeholders are exposed to and the
complexity of the processing of the signals.
Unique meaningful attributes -USP
Linked to how brand users expect the brand to
perform
Strong brand associations involve the creation of
stakeholder perceptions and awareness 
Shaped by experience and contact with the
brand
Refer to how brand users interpret and evaluate
the brand and related marketing information. The
brand image evaluation is determined by the
perceptions, expectations and experiences.
Figure 1. Depiction of the six variables of brand image formulated from Bosch et al. (2006a, 11).
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JoURNAL oF MARKETiNG CoMMUNiCATioNS  3
2008; Gordon 1999 cited in Cowley 1999; Bosch et al., 2006a; Ross and Harradine 2011; Saaksjarvi and 
Samiee 2011; Srivastava 2011). The existing limited frameworks are often descriptive rather than applied 
(Gordon 1999), and often indistinct with little grounding in existing brand image research (Aaker and 
Joachimsthaler 2002; Johns and Glymothy, 2008; Ross and Harradine 2011; Saaksjarvi and Samiee 2011; 
Srivastava 2011).
Bosch et al. (2006a) identified six variables from the existing literature on brand image and formu-
lated a framework to explore and operationalise the image of a brand from an external perspective. 
According to Bosch et al. (2006a), the six-variable framework is grounded in the existing literature on 
brand image (Coop 2005; Keller 1993; Nandan 2005; Nilson and Surrey 1998; Smith 2001; Van Gelder 
2003). Moreover, the six components of brand image, namely strength, uniqueness, expectations, percep-
tions and associations, experiences and evaluations are said to shape brand image (Bosch et al. 2006a). A 
visual aid depicting the six variables of brand image framework can be seen in Figure 1.
According to Bosch et al. (2006a), Strength is determined by the extent and complexity of the brand 
identity signals external stakeholders are exposed to and the complexity of decoding the signals. Bosch 
et al. (2006a) proposed Uniqueness as an important variable of brand image, which includes identifying 
unique meaningful attributes which distinguishes the brand, thus creating a competitive advantage. 
The uniqueness of the brand should also serve as a reason why stakeholders should embrace the brand, 
(Bosch et al. 2006a). The third variable outlined by Bosch et al. (2006a, 14) is the idea of expectations; 
specifically how consumers expect the brand to perform. These prospective attributes provide insight 
into the outlook consumers associate with the brand. The fourth variable explores the perceptions and 
association consumers ascribe to brands (Bosch et al. 2006a), which may also highlight brand awareness 
and a greater understanding of reasoned and emotional brand image attributes. The experiences variable 
refers to the contact the consumer has with the brand. The final brand image variable, evaluations, is 
determined by the expectations, perceptions and associations and experiences of the brand in question.
The framework outlined in Bosch et al. (2006a) was formulated and employed as part of a research 
study to explore the external brand image of a higher educational institute in South Africa. This sug-
gests that the framework (Bosch et al. 2006a) seems to offer an operational and systematic approach to 
deconstruct brand image. However, the six variables or ‘brand image framework’ has not been extended 
to other contexts to assess this proposition. Furthermore, only two of the six variables were actually 
applied in the original study (Bosch et al. 2006b). Therefore, this suggests that the original model has 
not been applied in its entirety, which raises questions about its functionality.
Three of the six variables ‘uniqueness’,‘ perceptions and associations’ and ‘expectations’ are well 
defined and suggest simple application. However, the remaining three variables of the brand image 
framework appear vague and unclear in terms of conceptualisation. For example, the ‘strength’ variable 
is poorly defined and Bosch et al. (2006a) provide limited elaboration into the ‘extent’ and ‘complexity’ 
of brand identity signals. it is unclear whether the variable is designed to measure or test the strength 
of these espoused signals or designed to calculate the extent of these signals projected by brands. 
Similarly, the definition of the ‘experiences’ variable (Bosch et al. 2006a, 14) appears ambiguous with 
little explanation. The variable definition could only be clarified by tracing the sources and existing 
research to understand how this variable was developed (Keller 1993; Nilson and Surrey 1998). The 
conceptualisation of the ‘evaluations’ appears confusing and required deeper understanding before 
application. The conceptualisation is determined by considering the ‘expectations’, ‘perceptions and 
associations’ and ‘experiences’ variables and referred to how external stakeholders interpreted and 
evaluated the brand (Bosch et al. 2006a). This suggests that the ‘evaluations’ variable was merely an 
overview or replication of the previous applied variables, reapplied. Therefore, the brand image frame-
work requires greater clarification and understanding. This can be achieved by critically applying all 
six variables in pursuit of deconstructing the external image of a brand. Ultimately, this research seeks 
to critically apply the Bosch et al. (2006a) model which will highlight its transfer potential to different 
contexts and the opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of a brand’s external image. This in 
turn will go some way in addressing the call for a greater understanding of the image creation process 
from an external orientation (McEnally and de Chernatony 1999).
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Political brand image
This issue of how to deconstruct or operationalise brand image insights extends to the context of polit-
ical brand image. Research in political brand image ‘is of critical importance and as such merits further 
analysis’ (Smith 2001, 992) and continues to be the case (French and Smith 2010; Needham and Smith 
2015; Phipps et al. 2010; Smith and French 2011). The limited research political brand image research 
has tended to adopt a measurable, quantitative approach (French and Smith 2010; Mortimore et al. 
2014). For example, Mortimore et al. (2014) measured the perceptions of the party leaders from the 
three main political parties in the UK and tested its relationship with the overall satisfaction for each 
leader. With the use of national survey data on voter’s perceptions of party leaders during the 2010 UK 
General Election combined with satisfaction scores, Mortimore et al. (2014) highlighted the complexity 
and unpredictability of investigating political image in terms of leadership and positioning. Further, 
the work by Mortimore et al. (2014) highlighted the problematic nature of using image attributes 
designed for an earlier study, namely a published opinion poll. This suggests that before embarking on 
measurement and testing of brand image, future image research should consider in-depth exploration 
of the positioned perceptions, associations and imagery (Mortimore et al. 2014).
Furthermore, the scarcity of research devoted to political brand image does not detail how the asso-
ciations and perceptions were uncovered from the perspective of external stakeholders (Mortimore 
et al. 2014; Peng and Hackley 2009; Smith 2001; Smith and French 2011). This is reinforced with calls 
for more exploratory research into political brand image (Davies and Mian 2010; Needham and Smith 
2015; Peng and Hackley 2009; Smith and French 2011). Ultimately, there is limited understanding of a 
political brand from an external perspective that addressed the concept of ‘brand image’ profoundly. 
As there are limited frameworks to operationalise brand image research, the conceptualisation outlined 
by Bosch et al. (2006a) provides an opportunity to explore brand image and assess its applicability to 
the political context. Where existing branding tools and scales have been employed in existing political 
branding studies, they were often modified or extended to suit the unique environment (Guzman and 
Sierra 2009; Pich et al. 2014; Smith 2009). Nevertheless, in order to critically assess the ‘transfer potential’ 
(Schneider 2004, 60) of the six variables outlined by Bosch et al. (2006a) in exploration of the ‘political’ 
brand image, a political brand had to be presented as the unit of analysis.
The Conservative Party
The UK Conservative Party has been considered complex, diverse with often contrasting values and 
interests (Budge et al. 2001; Kavanagh 2000; Lee and Beech 2009). After three failed election defeats 
and three Conservative Party leaders, the UK Conservative Party failed in its attempt to modernise, 
reinvent and reconnect with the electorate, (Denham and o’Hara 2007; Smith 2009). in December 2005, 
David Cameron was elected as leader of the UK Conservative Party, proposing it was time to modernise 
(Denham and o’Hara 2007), unite the party and make the Party re-electable for the 2010 UK General 
Election. Furthermore, David Cameron attempted to reshape the UK Conservative Party and dispel 
negative associations, including the perceptions that the Party was out-of-touch, primarily focused on 
immigration and seen to represent the rich and privileged few (Ashcroft 2010; Helm 2010). Therefore, 
David Cameron’s aim was to decontaminate the ‘Tory brand’ by addressing the party’s negative brand 
image (Ashcroft 2010; Bale 2011; Jones 2010; Lee and Beech 2009). Subsequently, as this paper aims 
to critically assess the applicability of the brand image framework (Bosch et al. 2006a) to deconstruct 
the external view of a political brand, the UK Conservative Party during the 2010 UK General Election 
serves to contextualise this research. Further, this is the first occasion the brand image framework (Bosch 
et al. 2006a) has been applied and critically assessed in the context of political branding.
Methodology
As this research set out to critically assess the applicability of the six brand image variables (Bosch 
et al. 2006a) by exploring the UK Conservative Party brand from an external perspective, focus group 
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JoURNAL oF MARKETiNG CoMMUNiCATioNS  5
discussions were considered an appropriate data collection method. The goal of a qualitative researcher 
is to build a comprehensive picture of the respondent’s background, attitudes, feelings and experi-
ences from the perspective of the respondent (Schutt 2004; Warren and Karner 2005). Focus groups 
are conventionally used by qualitative researchers as a context in which to frame group discussions 
(Langford and McDonagh 2003; Warren and Karner 2005; Zikmund 2003). A focus group discussion 
is ‘a well-planned research endeavour’ (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990, 51), ‘designed to obtain per-
ceptions of the group members on a defined area of interest’ (Langford and McDonagh 2003, 2) and 
regarded as an unstructured interview with a small group of participants, (Zikmund 2003). ‘Focused’ 
group discussions (Krueger 1998) have been described as ‘unpredictable’ and ‘organic in nature’ (Bloor 
et al. 2001, 19), and ideal for exploratory research (Bloor et al. 2001; Zikmund 2003). in addition, the 
focus group discussions were enhanced by projective techniques (Bond and Ramsey 2010; Pettigrew 
and Charters 2008), often used in qualitative research to gain a deeper understanding of the research 
area (Broeckelmann 2010). Furthermore, it has been argued that focus group discussions combined 
Table 1. sample of participants aged 18–24.
Participant code Political identification Education level Place of origin Date of focus group
P1fg1 Conservative PhD student north Yorkshire 23rd March 2010
P2fg1 floating voter undergraduate east riding of Yorkshire
P3fg1 floating voter PhD student Buckinghamshire
P4fg1 floating voter PhD student newcastle
P5fg1 labour undergraduate liverpool
P1fg2 labour a-level nottingham 13th april 2010
P2fg2 Conservative a-level nottingham
P3fg2 unknown a-level nottingham
P4fg2 labour a-level nottingham
P5fg2 floating voter a-level nottingham
P6fg2 Conservative a-level nottingham
P7fg2 floating voter a-level nottingham
P8fg2 labour a-level nottingham
P1fg3 unknown a-level nottingham 13th april 2010
P2fg3 unknown a-level nottingham
P3fg3 unknown a-level nottingham
P4fg3 Conservative a-level nottingham
P5fg3 unknown a-level nottingham
P1fg4 floating voter gCse nottinghamshire 14th april 2010
P2fg4 floating voter gCse nottinghamshire
P3fg4 Conservative gCse nottinghamshire
P4fg4 floating voter gCse nottinghamshire
P1fg5 floating voter PhD student london 19th april 2010
P2fg5 green party PhD student Cambridgeshire
P3fg5 floating voter PhD student newcastle
P4fg5 floating voter PhD student sheffield
P1fg6 liberal democrat a-level nottinghamshire 20th april 2010
P2fg6 floating voter a-level nottinghamshire
P3fg6 liberal democrat a-level nottinghamshire
P4fg6 floating voter a-level nottinghamshire
P5fg6 floating voter a-level Derbyshire
P6fg6 floating voter a-level nottinghamshire
P1fg7 liberal democrat a-level Maidenhead 22nd april 2010
P2fg7 Conservative a-level Maidenhead
P3fg7 tactical a-level Maidenhead
P4fg7 floating voter a-level Maidenhead
P5fg7 floating voter a-level Maidenhead
P6fg7 floating voter a-level Maidenhead
P7fg7 labour a-level Maidenhead
P8fg7 floating voter a-level Maidenhead
P1fg8 Conservative graduate east riding of Yorkshire 3rd May 2010
P2fg8 floating voter graduate east riding of Yorkshire
P3fg8 floating voter graduate Cambridgeshire
P4fg8 labour graduate east riding of Yorkshire
P5fg8 labour graduate east riding of Yorkshire
P6fg8 floating voter graduate Wakefield
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6  C. PiCH AND G. ARMANNSDoTTiR
with projective techniques have the ability to generate a deeper understanding of perceptions and 
highlight deep-seated associations (Baines and Chansarkar 2002; Bloor et al. 2001; Flick 1998; Krueger 
1998; Kvale 1996; Malhotra and Birks 2003).
Ultimately, 82-hour focus group discussions were conducted with a total of 46 young citizens aged 
18–24 years from three locations in England (Maidenhead, Nottingham, and Hull). Focus groups were 
conducted March 2010 – May 2010; the last focus group conducted four days before polling day on 
6th May 2010. Young citizens aged 18–24 years were selected as part of this study as they were spe-
cifically targeted by the UK Conservative Party following David Cameron’s leadership election as they 
were considered an untapped market (Ashcroft 2005; Charles 2009). For example, 39% of adults aged 
18–24 years voted in the 2001 UK General Election, 37% in the 2005 UK General Election and 44% in the 
2010 UK General Election (Worcester et al. 2011). in 2001, 27% of adults 18–24 years voted Conservative 
compared to 28% in 2005 and 30% in 2010 (Worcester et al. 2011). Therefore, this age group posed an 
opportunity for the Conservative Party. However, this segment constituted the weakest supporting 
group of the UK Conservative Party from 1992 to 2009 (Worcester et al. 2011). it was also considered 
the most disengaged of all the electoral segments (Dermody et al. 2010). Therefore, this segment of 
voters was considered an appropriate sample to frame the study. Gorman and Clayton (2005) argued 
that qualitative researchers tend to select a purposive sample technique as the aim is not to infer 
generalisations to the population, but to gain an understanding of a particular phenomenon from the 
perspective of specific groups of individuals (Alston and Bowles 2007; Daymon and Holloway 2011; 
Gorman and Clayton 2005; Zikmund 2003). Therefore, as this research had a specific purpose to explore 
the UK Conservative Party brand from the perspective of young adults aged 18–24 years; purposive 
sampling was deemed an appropriate sampling technique. Age therefore, was the only prerequisite for 
participation. Existing political affiliation or level of political engagement were not important factors to 
consider as this research aimed to explore the rich imagery associated with the political brand. Table 1 
presents the participant, their political affiliation, and place of origin, level of education and the date 
when the focus group was conducted.
The process of cyclical development (Gillham 2005), which proposes a number of stages to go 
through in order to design, develop and assess research tools/techniques was adopted to strengthen 
the reliability of data collection (Boddy 2005). The focus group schedule was reviewed by specialists 
in focus group research, including a seminar leader from the ‘Marketing Research Society’ and a brand 
manager for Boots UK. Both specialists highlighted no issues with the schedule or projective technique 
activities. A pilot focus group was also conducted in accordance with the process of cyclical develop-
ment (Gillham 2005).
The researcher independently transcribed and analysed the findings from the focus group discus-
sions, which strengthened the validity and reliability of the interpretation process and offered a con-
sistent approach to analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2003). in contrast, this could be seen as a limitation as 
the analytical process could be open to interpreter bias (Ramsey et al. 2006). However, this was ame-
liorated by following critical methods of interpretation, including echoic probing and the practice of 
cross-checking. Ultimately, this strengthened the reliability, internal-reliability and validity of the data 
collection, analytical process and interpretation of findings (Boddy 2005; Day 1989).
Findings
To reiterate, this study aimed to address the limited understanding of the operationalisation process of 
brand image in a political context from an external orientation. This was achieved by critically applying 
the findings to the six variables of the brand image; strength, uniqueness, expectations, perceptions 
and associations, experiences and evaluations (Bosch et al. 2006a). Further, the political brand was 
investigated using the ‘trinity’ proposition focusing on the party leader, political party and party policy 
(Butler et al. 2011; Davies and Mian 2010; Smith and French 2011). Consequently, the brand image 
framework served as a pragmatic and operational tool to deconstruct the political brand image of the 
UK Conservative Party. A visual aid depicting the key applied findings to the brand image framework 
can be seen in Figure 2.
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Strength
The rearticulated strength variable explored the internally projected brand identity signals, discussed 
participant’s awareness which generated a deeper understanding of external stakeholder’s opinion and 
attitude of UK Conservative Party signals. These brand identity signals included the Conservative Party 
logo, positioning theme of ‘change’, communications tools such as WebCameron and a discussion on 
Conservative Party policy and values. The findings revealed that many external stakeholders to some 
extent were aware of Conservative ‘Party’ signals. Further, it was no surprise that Conservative support-
ers revealed favourable opinions of Conservative signals and Labour supporters revealed critical views 
of Conservative signals. For example, a Labour supporting undergraduate from Liverpool highlighted 
puzzlement with the Conservative ‘oak tree’ logo;
we don’t know the link between the Party and the logo ... would have thought [sic] more green [political party] but 
didn’t think that was Tory policy. (P5FG1)
in contrast, Conservative supporting participants projected positive interpretations highlighting the 
tree represented ‘change’ (P6FG2), ‘future, new beginnings’ (P1FG1), with one participant liking the 
Conservative Party logo due to its simple qualities, (P3FG4). However, many floating voters highlighted 
limited knowledge and confusion with Conservative brand identity signals. For example, a floating 
voter from Buckinghamshire thought the tree was ‘creative … child-like … not sure what it is meant to 
symbolise’ (P3FG1). This lack of clarity and debate was also associated with David Cameron’s web-based 
communication tool; ‘WebCameron’, which allowed behind the scenes access into David Cameron’s 
everyday family life. ‘WebCameron’ was also seen as fake, superficial and actually alienated a number 
of participants. A floating voter from Nottinghamshire believed the WebCameron podcasts ‘seem fake 
and make him look arrogant’ (P6FG6). Similarly, another floating voter from Maidenhead revealed 
that David Cameron’s use of podcasts highlighted the party was ‘trying too hard … puts people off” 
(P5FG7). This sense of critique and confusion also linked to the nationwide poster campaign in part 
David Cameron
• Limitedawarenessofcampaignposters
• CampaignPosters–lackofunderstanding
• DividedopinionregardingWebCameron
• “Tryingtoohard”
The Conservative Party
• Universalawarenessoflogo
• DiverseRangeofexpressions
• Positive,Negative,Cynical,
QuestionableandPuzzlement
Conservative Party Policy
• Interchangeablypresented
• Conservativevalues
• Confusion–distinctlackofclarity
• Policybarelydiscussed-oftenmisinformed
• HighProfileInitiatives–cynicallyexpressed
• “Change”–ambiguous,patronising,nospecifics
Uniqueness
David Cameron
• Positive&negativeattributes–transcend?
• Positivesgenuine?
• “Tryingtoohard”
• RaisedConservativePartyprofile
• Authenticity
The Conservative Party
• Littleornodifferentiation
• Shouldbedifferences
• ConservativePartylogo-unique
Conservative Party Policy
• Relatetothe‘strength’variable
• Labourmoreworking-class
• Increasedunemployment&armedforcesspending
• Morestylethansubstance
• Littleornoidea
Expectations
David Cameron
• Despite awareness –uncertainty 
• Need more information
• Too good to be true
• Questionability 
• Wary
• Negative expressions
• Who will he look after?
The Conservative Party
• Positive
• Negative
• Neutral
• Questionable –including Conservative 
supporters
• Retrospective Conservative Party’s
Conservative Party Policy
• Positive
• 19 participants believed UK will suffer
• Stay the same –no substantial changes 
Strength
David Cameron
• Age–debatable
• Personality–debatable
• Positive&NegativeCharacteristics
• Whatdoeshestandfor?Expectations?
• BrandofConservatism
• ChangedtheimagenottheParty
The Conservative Party
• Commontop-of-mindassociations
• Howevercontrastinginterpretations
•Duality?
• Whofor?Associationsdistinctfromreality?
• Similarassociations,dissimilarattitudes
• DiverseConservativeMPs
Conservative Party Policy
• Lackofunderstanding
• Likelytoaddress
• richricherpoorpoorer
• Norealchange
• Conservativesleastclear
• Questionability
Perceptions &
Associations
Experiences
Evaluations
David Cameron
• No direct experience
• Indirection experience
• Television, WebCameron, SamCam
• LeadersDebates
Conservative Party Policy
• Nodirectexperience
• Noindirectexperience
The Conservative Party
• Contrasting expectations
• Duality –top-of-mind & who
• Consistent often contrasting perceptions
• Diverse & distinct multiple identities
• Little direct experience
• Indirect experiences; negative & New Labour 
David Cameron
• Questionability of expectations
• Uncertain, wary & cynicism
• Positive & negative characteristics
• Age & personality debatable 
• Changed the Conservative Party?
• Indirect experiences; WebCameron, SamCam
Conservative Party Policy
• Little or no knowledge of CPP
• However contrasting expectations
• 19 interpreted as negative expressions
• Lack of understanding, confusion & disbelief 
• Sceptical & “least clear”
• No direct or indirect experience
The Conservative Party
• Very little direct experience
• However indirect experience 
• Negative
• NewLabour
Figure 2. the brand image of the uk Conservative Party from the perspective of young citizens aged 18–24 years from across england.
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alienated rather than attracted participants to the UK Conservative Party. For example, a floating voter 
from Nottinghamshire argued ‘what do they mean with the posters … they should be telling us what 
they will do … at first i thought it was Gordon Brown’s party’ (P32FG4).
in terms of ‘Policy’, very few participants provided illustrations or awareness of Conservative Policy. 
For example, participants were confused and ‘didn’t really know’ (P3FG2) Conservative Party policy or 
values, with one participant suggesting that the Party did not have any policies, (P5FG1). one floating 
voter from Yorkshire revealed;
i don’t know what he stands for … don’t know any of his policies. Maybe [he] should tell me some 
of his policies. (P2FG1)
Similarly, a floating voter from Derbyshire believed;
i think people won’t vote for him because they don’t actually know what will happen under a Conservative  
government. (P5FG6)
Nevertheless, the idea of ‘change’ was a major occurring theme illustrated by participants, yet it lacked 
specifics, understanding and believability and argued to be ‘patronising’ by one participant. For exam-
ples, a Conservative supporter from Nottingham highlighted that the ‘idea of change was coming 
across but we need more information’. This ambiguity of ‘change’ was shared by another Conservative 
supporter who argued ‘uncertain of how he is going to make a difference’ (P5FG6). This was supported 
by participant from Maidenhead who revealed:
Cameron keeps talking about change but not many people know what he’s going to do. No specifics. Don’t think 
he’s got a real idea of what he means by change. (P7FG7)
Subsequently, many participants of all political affiliation were conscious of some Conservative brand 
identity signals which have the ability to play a role in brand image creation (Bosch et al. 2006a; Nandan 
2005). However, the interpretation and understanding of the brand identity signals were often inconsist-
ent from the intended projection (de Chernatony 2007). Therefore, calls for greater clarity and specific 
detail would support the recognised brand identity signals which would strengthen the Conservative 
Party brand image in the mind of external stakeholders.
Uniqueness
The uniqueness variable was broadly articulated as the unique meaningful attributes external stakehold-
ers ascribed to the UK Conservative Party brand (Bosch et al. 2006a). in addition, the uniqueness of the 
brand should also serve as a reason why stakeholders should embrace the brand (Bosch et al. 2006a). 
However, this research highlighted that the UK Conservative Party brand failed to clearly communicate 
unique meaningful attributes to differentiate itself from political competitors in the mind of external 
Figure 3. strengths and Weaknesses presented in reference to David Cameron.
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stakeholders. For example, one Green supporting postgraduate participant considered ‘i don’t see any 
actual difference, people [politicians] are the same ... but they’re supposed to be different’ (P2FG5). 
Similarly, one floating voter argued the Conservatives were a little superficial, focusing more on style 
than substance and expressed ‘when i hear about Labour i hear more about what they’re going to do 
[sic] whereas Cameron and his silly campaigns look good but provide no detail or specifics’ (P2FG1). 
Despite participants believing there was little or no difference between mainstream political parties, 
participants did recognise the distinction between political party leaders. UK Conservative Party leader 
David Cameron was seen as a positive and negative unique attribute of brand image evident in Figure 3.
it was also found that ‘David Cameron’ was one of the first associations participants expressed in 
relation to the UK Conservative Party, despite participants expressing contrasting attitudinal perspec-
tives. A number of participants of all political affiliation conceived the idea that with David Cameron 
as leader, it made participants more interested (P2FG2), raised the profile of the Conservative Party 
(P1FG6), ‘wouldn’t have considered voting for the Conservatives if it wasn’t for Cameron’ (P5FG6) and 
‘made me look at the Tories differently’ (P3FG3). Therefore, David Cameron highlighted more unique 
associations than the ‘Party’. Participants demonstrated a limited awareness of Conservative Party policy, 
were often confused and participant’s proposed Conservative Party policy lacked clarity and under-
standing. Nevertheless, several participants revealed small distinctions between the Labour Party and 
the Conservative Party in terms of policy and associations. one floating voter from Nottinghamshire 
believed the Labour Party was ‘more working-class’ (P4FG4), with more of a focus on employment, public 
and social welfare, higher taxes and bridging the social class divide. Contrastingly, a Conservative sup-
porting participant considered a Conservative administration would increase spending on unemploy-
ment and the armed forces (P3FG4), with various external stakeholders associating privatisation, focus 
on the individual, the idea of change and cutting the deficit attributes in relation to the Conservative 
Party.
Expectations
The expectations variable referred to how external stakeholders expected the UK Conservative Party 
to perform if the party were successful at the 2010 UK General Election. Many participants were uncer-
tain of what to expect from a Conservative Party in government as they had nothing to base their 
expectations on. For example, a Conservative supporting participant from Nottingham revealed ‘i 
wonder what will happen’ (P6FG2), ‘great, what do they do then’ (P2FG4) expressed by a floating voter 
from Nottinghamshire and ‘i know he looks better on TV but what the hell is this Big Society ... is he 
Thatcher in disguise’ (P3FG7), proposed by a tactical voter from Maidenhead. This often resulted in 
retrospective thinking and associating the party with stereotypical perceptions. For example, a Labour 
supporting participant stated that citizens will ‘start guessing what he’s [Cameron] going to do, [sic] so 
retrospectively’ and because of the lack of substance and clarity, retrospective thinking will be used to 
determine what to expect from a Conservative government (P4FG8). This idea was also presented by a 
floating voter from Nottinghamshire whereby ‘people with little or no interest in politics only know of 
Conservatives under Thatcher [Margaret]. These stories are passed down generations’ (P4FG4), therefore 
a retrospective rather than a prospective outlook. Despite Cameron’s increased awareness in the minds 
of participants, the majority raised a series of questions rather than answers relating to expectations. 
This was articulated by a floating voter (A-level) from Nottinghamshire ‘i think people won’t vote for him 
because they don’t actually know what will happen under a Conservative government. People aren’t 
sure if Cameron will go easy on the posh people’ (P5FG6). This lack of clarity was also expressed by a 
Conservative supporting A-level student from the City of Nottingham whereby the ‘idea of change is 
coming across but we need more information’ (P2FG2).
in terms of ‘policy’, many participants including two Conservative supporters considered the UK 
would pretty much look the same under a Conservative administration in comparison with a Labour 
government. For example, a floating voter (postgraduate) from London conceived ‘no change to my 
everyday life, so UK will not change from my perspective ... unless they scrap the NHS pensions’ (P3FG1). 
Furthermore, a floating voter (young professional) from Cambridgeshire argued that the UK will look 
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‘the same’ under Conservative rule, however stated ‘[sic] but myself and my family may be poorer’ 
(P3FG8) if the Conservatives are elected. However, several participants highlighted positive and negative 
associations in relation to expectations of Conservative ‘policy’. For example, a Conservative supporter 
with no higher education believed Conservative policy would equate to ‘more support for forces & 
NHS’ and ‘tax increase not taking place’ (P3FG4). in contrast, a young professional floating voter from 
Wakefield expressed a Conservative UK would lead to ‘oppressed poor, stagnant economy, spending 
cuts and class divide’, in contrast to ‘all the same, safe pair of hands – Brown [Gordon] strong future’ 
(P6FG8). Therefore, despite the large number of respondents highlighting little knowledge of what to 
expect from Conservative policy, a small number highlighted emotive expectations, some in line with 
their political perspective.
Perceptions and associations
This variable included the perceptions and associations external stakeholders ascribed to the UK 
Conservative brand. it was revealed that the UK Conservative ‘Party’ had not managed to completely 
dispel the party of the rich, privileged and upper-classes perceptions and associations and failed to 
demonstrate the desired inclusive image. Some of the key themes can be seen in Figure 4.
For example, a number of common themes were discovered, with the majority of respondents recall-
ing David Cameron, Margaret Thatcher, Change, and Party of the Rich and Upper-class people. Furthermore, 
the top-of-mind associations revealed genuine support for the Conservative Party, for example, the 
‘party’ was seen as ‘a breath of fresh air – a positive change’ (P6FG2), and also disclosed ideas of hon-
esty, optimism (P1FG1), support for Conservative Party policy (P4FG3; P5FG3) and ideology (P1FG8). 
Therefore, the findings suggested that the ‘Party’ had come some way in refocusing the image of the UK 
Conservative Party and how the party was perceived by highlighting traditionally held perceptions but 
also the newer Cameron-inspired values. Many participants including Conservative supporters remained 
uncertain, confused and raised questions regarding ‘who’ the UK Conservative Party represents. For 
example, the ‘Party’ was perceived to represent the upper-class (P5FG1), wealthy individuals (P3FG2), 
posh people (P4FG4), rich bankers (P3FG5), rural (P2FG5), traditionalists (P3FG5), public school and from 
the ‘playing fields of Eton’, (P7FG7). However, several participants including one Conservative supporter 
from the City of Nottingham proposed the Conservatives are for the middle-classes (P4FG3; P5FG3), and 
‘they’re less the party of the rich but still have an association with the upper-classes because they used 
to represent them’ (P2FG7). Therefore, the findings suggested that the perceptions and associations 
are incoherent with David Cameron’s aim or ‘task’ for the UK Conservative Party to be perceived as an 
inclusive political party for everyone.
it was also found that there was a duality with the UK Conservative ‘Party’ brand which could be 
divided into the ‘corporate’ and ‘individual’ political brand. Several participants believed local members 
of Parliament (or local political brand) were often distinct, possessed their own identities, approacha-
ble and more trustworthy in comparison with the corporate. For example, William Hague MP (former 
Figure 4. Common themes identified in association with the uk Conservative Party.
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Conservative Party leader 1997–2001) had an established supported identity compared with the 
national party because ‘he’s more North Yorkshire’ and ‘maybe because Hague is local MP’ (P1FG8). 
A Labour supporting young professional also from East Riding of Yorkshire conceived Ken Clarke MP 
(Rushcliffe-Nottinghamshire) ‘who is clearly wealthy (but) comes across as approachable’ and well 
established (P4FG8). Therefore, ‘individual’ political brands were often more appealing and engaging 
compared with the ‘corporate’ Conservative Party.
David Cameron was perceived as different from previous Conservative leaders, dynamic and asso-
ciated in part with new non-Conservative policy areas or un-Tory themes. However, despite many 
participants not knowing what David Cameron ‘stood for’ and projecting negative associations of the 
Conservative ‘Party’, the majority of participants provided positive perceptions of the Conservative Party 
leader. To some participants, age was an important factor in association with David Cameron, with the 
expectation that the Prime Minister should be young, energetic and enthusiastic (P4FG3), and that a 
younger party leader would make participants relate to David Cameron more and vice versa (P5FG3). 
David Cameron was also said to hold more of a personality than the other political party leaders and 
was said to be friendly, with excellent communication skills, family orientated, approachable, amusing, 
talkative, likeable, passionate, a strong leader and charismatic.
Nevertheless, the ‘perception’ of Conservative Party policy was debatably expressed. The UK 
Conservative Party failed to address a lack of understanding, confusion and general disbelief that the 
party actually had ‘policies’ and failed to convince the participants that the party would adhere to party 
pledges. For example, one floating voter from Maidenhead (A-level) argued ‘out of all the different 
parties the Conservatives are least clear about what they want and how can i support a party that i 
don’t know what they stand for’ (P6FG7). in addition, another floating voter from Maidenhead (A-level) 
argued that ‘the Conservatives have lost their identity slightly’ and this was down to the lack of clear 
policies (P5FG7). However, several external stakeholders positively perceived that the Conservative 
Party had renewed its reputation for economic competence, something dashed after ‘Black Wednesday’ 
and perceived to be tough on immigration. Nevertheless, this traditional Conservative theme of ‘tough 
on immigration’ was something David Cameron had attempted to distance the party from since his 
leadership in 2005 (Ashcroft 2010).
Experiences
The variable was subdivided into two areas; direct experiences and indirect experiences. Direct expe-
rience focused on the external stakeholder’s own personal experience and contact, whereas indirect 
experience referred to external sources of information, for example, word of mouth, advertising or 
general communication. The majority of participants illustrated very little direct experience with the 
UK Conservative ‘Party’. However, two ‘self-proclaimed’ Labour supporters expressed positive direct 
experience with their local Conservative Member of Parliament. This was contradictory to the negative 
associations and perceptions of the Conservative Party and pessimistic expectations of a hypothetical 
Conservative government. For example, a staunch Labour supporting participant argued ‘i’m not a Tory 
but when i lived in Beverley had the best MP, [sic] know where he is and if i lived in Beverley i would vote 
for him’ (P5FG8). Additionally, ‘local MP’s make a huge difference and are passionate about their area. 
By personally trusting and contacting local MP i can actually resonate with him’ (P4FG8), despite being 
a Labour voter. This suggests that genuine direct experience may have the ability to attract a broader 
support base which goes beyond party politics. Furthermore, this strengthens the idea of distinction 
between the corporate and individual ‘Party’ brand. However, the findings also highlighted that direct 
and indirect experiences are often independent of the political brand’s control. For example, a float-
ing voter argued that ‘my mum went on the Poll Tax March ... if Thatcher is mentioned in my house all 
hell breaks loose’ (P1FG4). Similarly, a floating voter from Maidenhead highlighted ‘i feel when they 
[Conservatives] come to power they’ll do what New Labour did and didn’t actually stick to their word’ 
(P6FG7). Therefore, indirect experiences can shape imagery associated with the UK Conservative ‘Party’, 
which in turn could be problematic for political brands.
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Unsurprisingly, participants revealed a direct experience with David Cameron. Several participants 
highlighted a number of indirect experiences, such as viewing appearances of David Cameron on the 
morning television programme GMTV, his social media tool ‘WebCameron’ and the infamous Leaders 
Debates broadcast during the 2010 General Election Campaign. Similar to the uniqueness variable, 
the indirect experiences revealed positive and negative associations linked to David Cameron. For 
example, opinion was divided with WebCameron; attempting to normalise himself’ (P5FG6), ‘seems fake 
and makes him look arrogant’ (P6FG6), ‘trying too hard ... puts people off’ (P5FG7) and ‘trying to reach 
out to young people but kind of messing it up’ (P2FG1). Participants had no direct or indirect contact 
with Conservative Party policy and this maybe down to the fact the Conservative Party had been in 
opposition for 13years since 1997.
Evaluations
The evaluations variable was determined by revisiting the expectations, perceptions and associations 
and experiences (Bosch et al. 2006a). Despite the repeatable nature of the evaluations variable, it allowed 
the applied findings to be clearly presented and it acknowledged the key points from each variable. This 
ultimately provided a broad overview of the brand image of the UK Conservative Party brand from the 
perspective of external stakeholders (citizens 18–24 years) minus the applied findings accommodated 
under the strengths and uniqueness variables. For example, the UK Conservative ‘Party’ to a certain 
extent failed to communicate a coherent, consistent and understandable political brand to external 
stakeholders aged 18–24 years. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the UK Conservative ‘Party’ had 
come some way in refocusing the image of their political brand with the idea of ‘change’ and association 
with ‘David Cameron’, who was often stronger and identifiable compared to the ‘Party’. Unfortunately, 
this was often undermined by the limited understanding and questionable nature of Conservative Party 
‘policy’. Therefore, the UK Conservative Party brand image under the leadership of David Cameron can 
be considered complex, multifaceted and often contentious.
Discussion
Given there are very few models or frameworks that promote the deconstruction and understanding 
of brand image, this paper aimed to critically apply the brand image framework (Bosch et al. 2006a) in 
exploration of the three elements of the UK Conservative Party. This study also addresses the limited 
understanding devoted to political brand image which goes beyond the usual measurable, quanti-
tative approach (French and Smith 2010; Mortimore et al. 2014). This study was the first occasion all 
six variables outlined by Bosch et al. (2006a) had been used to explore the external understanding of 
a brand. The original study by Bosch et al. (2006a, 2006b) conceptualised six variables however only 
applied two of the six variables. Further, Bosch et al. (2006a, 2006b) failed to provide rationale for only 
applying two of the six variables in the original study. if Bosch et al. (2006a, 2006b) had applied all six 
variables in the original study, then this may have highlighted the problematic nature with part of the 
framework in terms of functionality and operationalisation. This research therefore, highlighted that the 
original conceptualisation put forward by Bosch et al. (2006a) needed to be reconceptualised before 
application. Future research therefore should avoid the original conceptualisation due to its ambiguous, 
unclear and repetitive nature. Further, future research should consider this revised conceptualisation 
outlined in Table 2. This revised framework clearly opertationalises the image of a brand and provides 
a simplified mechanism to explore a political brand from an external perspective.
Following some refinement, this research demonstrated that the six variables of brand image (Bosch 
et al. 2006a) have significant ‘transfer potential’ (Schneider 2004, 60) in deconstructing the political brand 
of the UK Conservative Party. However, three of the six variables, namely uniqueness, perceptions and 
associations, and expectations required no adaptation to explore the three elements of the Conservative 
brand (party, leader and policy). The three variables were well defined and pragmatic in application 
with the aid of focus group discussions and projective techniques. However, it could be argued that 
‘uniqueness’ equating to unique meaningful attributes should relate to all aspects of brand image. For 
example, all variables including strengths (physical brand identity signals), expectations, perceptions/
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associations and experience should communicate uniqueness in the mind of the consumer and provide 
consumers with meaningful attributes to distinguish a brand from competitors. ‘Uniqueness’ therefore 
should equate not only to a variable of brand image, but also a key element of all variables to ensure 
a clear and consistent external understanding of a brand. in terms of the UK Conservative Party, brand 
image failed in part to communicate clear points of differentiation for the ‘Party’ and ‘Policy’ compared 
to competitors; however, David Cameron was differentiated and possessed unique attributes in the 
minds of participant. The ‘expectations’ variable also offered pragmatic qualities in terms of application. 
Nonetheless, the expectations variable highlighted the problematic nature for opposition political 
brands (Smith 2005) as there is little/no evidence of performance in government for voters to base their 
expectations. This can often result in retrospective thinking or the premise of unanswered questions 
surrounding the political brand and this was the case with the UK Conservative Party. The ‘perceptions 
and associations’ variable provided simple transference as this highlighted that the UK Conservative 
brand image was a multidimensional construct of traditional and stereotypical imagery combined with 
un-Tory themes led by a dynamic party leader. This variable also highlighted the potential of individual 
or local party brands in strengthening voter engagement and beyond party politics support.
Table 2. the deconstruction of political brand image.
Brand image 
variables Perspective
Political brand image variables - defi-
nition Desired outcome
strength external the ‘strength’ variable refers to the external 
understanding and awareness of the brand 
identity signals (for example physical com-
munication tools) projected by the political 
brand. in the context of political branding; 
the political brand is conceptualised as the 
‘party’, ‘party leader’ and ‘party policy’
external stakeholders should have a good 
understanding and awareness of brand iden-
tity signals. Brand identity signals should be 
clear and informative. successful brands have 
consistency between how brands are commu-
nicated and how they are understood
uniqueness external ‘uniqueness’ refers to unique meaningful 
attributes and reasons why people should 
support/adopt the brand. However, the 
other four brand image variables should 
offer unique meaningful attributes to 
distinguish a political brand from competi-
tors, which should enhance success
Political brands should communicate inter-
nally developed and envisaged meaningful 
attributes to external stakeholders, with the 
aim of linking the positive and focused attrib-
utes to the political brand
expectations external ‘expectations’ refers to how the external 
stakeholders expect the political brand to 
perform. this can be difficult for opposition 
political brands and can be influenced by 
the narrative set by political competitors
Political brands should offer clear visions or 
examples of what external stakeholders can 
expect if the brand is elected into govern-
ment. this direction will offer understanding 
and reduce anxiety. further, it will allow 
political brands a degree of control of their 
vision and reduce the likelihood of external 
stakeholders listening to narratives set by 
political competitors
Perceptions 
and associa-
tions
external this variable refers to the perceptions and 
associations external stakeholders ascribe 
to political brands. as political brands can 
also be distinguished via corporate and 
individual/sub-brands. thus an individual 
political brand can be contextualised as 
the ‘local party’, candidate/politician ‘local 
leader’ and ‘local party policy’
Political brands should consider how they are 
currently perceived and understood before 
attempting to reposition imagery attached 
to the brand. this will highlight whether 
perceptions and associations need to be 
refined or changed if external understanding 
is inconsistent with internal positioning. 
successful associations and perceptions are 
positive, engaging and simple
experiences external this variable refers to the external 
stakeholders experience with the political 
brand. this can be divided into direct 
(external stakeholders own personal 
experience/contact) and indirect (sources 
of information such as word-of-mouth or 
narratives by competitors)
Political brands should utilise direct and 
indirect experiences to connect or reconnect 
with the electorate. this will develop external 
brand image. Direct experience has the ability 
to attract a broader support base which can 
go beyond party politics. the utilisation of 
‘experiences’ can be used by corporate and 
individual political brands. Political brands 
should be aware of the complexity of attempt-
ing to control indirect experiences
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Despite the significant and pragmatic transfer potential of uniqueness, perceptions/associations and 
expectations variables, the strength variable, experiences variable and evaluations variable required 
adaptation from their original conceptualisation before application. For example, the original definition 
of the ‘strength’ variable was unclear and poorly defined. Further, the original definition suggested the 
variable was designed to measure/test the strength of brand identity signals; however, Bosch et al. 
(2006a) failed to explain how this could be achieved. Therefore, as this paper adopted an exploratory 
approach, the aim was to understand rather than test/measure the attitudes and imagery attached to 
the UK Conservative Party brand identity signals from the perspective of participants. This simplified 
definition provided clarification during the application process. Thus, the original definition of the 
‘strength’ variable by Bosch et al. (2006a) was flawed. The revised strength variable highlighted that 
participants were aware of UK Conservative Party brand identity signals; however, participants pro-
jected conflicting opinions and indicated some confusion in terms of interpretation. Furthermore, many 
participants believed David Cameron had raised the profile of the party. Nevertheless, uncertainty and 
unanswered questions were associated with the UK Conservative Party brand.
Similarly, the original definition of the ‘experiences’ variable was ambiguous and only acquired clarity 
after tracing the sources and existing research. This in turn weakens the rigour and questions the validity 
of the original conceptualisation by Bosch et al. (2006a). With this in mind, future studies should avoid 
the original definition and consider the updated version set out in this study as this will provide deeper 
understanding of how to apply the variable to deconstruct political brand image. For example, once 
clarified and updated, the ‘experiences’ variable could be divided into direct and indirect experiences. 
As a result, it was found that very few participants had direct experience of the UK Conservative Party 
brand. However, several participants revealed their direct experience of the localised UK Conservative 
brand had the potential to have a positive impact on the national/corporate UK Conservative Party 
brand. This highlighted a dual nature to the UK Conservative Party brand and the ability to attract a 
broader support base beyond party politics. Existing research argued that the brand image of individual 
political brands is influenced by the ‘corporate’ political brand of the political party (Phipps et al. 2010). 
Therefore, ‘corporate’ political brands of political parties have the ability to hinder local politician’s 
reputation and in the case of this study, the positive brand image of the local Member of Parliament 
outweighed the negative brand image of the UK Conservative Party. Participants also revealed indirect 
experiences with the political brand, which was often independent of the Party’s control. Political entities 
should be aware of this when designing and managing their brands.
The final variable entitled ‘evaluations’ was defined as an overview of the expectations, perceptions/
associations and experiences variables. This suggested that the evaluations variable was merely an 
overview or replication of the previous applied findings, ‘reapplied’. Nevertheless, Bosch et al. (2006a) 
seemed to ignore the strength and uniqueness variables in defining the evaluations variable. Bosch 
et al. (2006a, 14) proposed the evaluations variable referred to how brand users interpret and evaluate 
the brand in question and ‘related marketing information’, which broadly implied a reference to the 
strength variable without explicitly acknowledging the strength variable. Further to this, the unique-
ness variable was neither explicitly implied nor implicitly referenced within the conceptualisation of 
the evaluations variable (Bosch et al. 2006a). To ignore the strength and uniqueness variables in the 
evaluation variable of the brand image of the UK Conservative Party brand questioned their relevance 
in the original framework. in the case of this research, the evaluations variable did not consider the 
‘brand identity signals’ or unique meaningful attributes linked or not linked to the party, leader or policy. 
This disregard for the strength and uniqueness variables had the potential to overlook findings which 
ultimately would have provided only a partial understanding of the brand image of the UK Conservative 
Party brand. For consistency, future studies adopting this revised framework should include all five 
variables when constructing the evaluation of brand image. However, this questions the relevance of 
a variable that is merely a reapplication of findings otherwise known as a summary section. Therefore, 
the ‘evaluations’ variable could be removed to avoid repetition and the findings from the five variables 
could be summarised in the conclusion section which would lead to logical closure.
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Conclusion
Smith (2001, 992) argued that ‘image in politics is of critical importance and as such merits further anal-
ysis’. Given there are limited tools to deconstruct brand image, greater elaboration was needed (Chen 
2010; Cretu and Brodie 2007; Guzman and Sierra 2009; Henrik and Fredrik 2006; Johns and Gylmothy 
2008; Knox and Freeman 2006; Poiesz 1989; Smith 2001). This paper therefore fulfils an identified prob-
lem of how to systematically deconstruct political brand image insights (Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2002; 
Johns and Glymothy, 2008; Gordon 1999 cited in Cowley 1999; Ross and Harradine 2011; Saaksjarvi and 
Samiee 2011; Srivastava 2011). This was achieved by critically applying the brand image framework 
(Bosch et al. 2006a) in exploration of the three elements of the UK Conservative Party brand from an 
external perspective.
The UK Conservative Party during the 2010 UK General Election contextualised the critique and 
deconstruction process. Nevertheless, the conceptualisation often required clarification, greater elab-
oration and rearticulation as the original version set out by Bosch et al. (2006a) was often ambiguous, 
somewhat flawed and lacked rigour. When applied with the political brand image, the clarified, reartic-
ulated and simplified conceptualisation provided a deeper understanding of the operationalisation of 
the external orientation of David Cameron’s Conservative brand. This in turn highlighted that the UK 
Conservative Party brand image under his leadership can be considered complex, multifaceted and 
often contentious, which was inconsistent with the existing literature on successful political brands 
(Needham 2006). Additionally, the UK Conservative Party had not managed to completely dispel the 
party of the rich, privileged and upper-classes perceptions and associations (Ashcroft 2010; Helm, 
2010) and failed to demonstrate the desired inclusive image. However, it can be argued that David 
Cameron and the UK Conservative Party had come some way in decontaminating the ‘Tory brand’ image. 
Nevertheless, many questions and uncertainties (Needham 2006) remained. Thus, the brand image of 
the UK Conservative Party required attention following the 2010 UK General Election.
Implications
This paper provides a clarified, rearticulated and simplified conceptualisation of brand image (Table 2), 
which can be seen as a mechanism to explore a brand from an external orientation. This may require 
refinement and adaptation if transferred to other contexts. Nevertheless, this framework rather than 
the original conceptualisation can be used in future research to deconstruct the external orientation of 
a brand within and beyond the political context. This paper also offers ground for future research into 
the current political brand image of the UK Conservative Party to assess its development and evolution 
since the 2010 UK General Election. Furthermore, this research provides political parties, candidates 
and organisations with the opportunity to gain deeper understandings of their brands and allow them 
to explore the coherency between external imagery and internally created brand identity. Finally, this 
paper provides a detailed account of how to explore political brand image and adds to the limited 
studies on how brands are positioned in the mind of consumers (Guzman and Sierra 2009; Needham 
and Smith 2015; Smith 2001).
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